Written by:

Tony Yang

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Los Angeles Tech Week Recap Day 3

Mucker Capital hosted four days of sessions during LA Tech Week 2026:

  • Day 1: AI Startup Disruption in Media & Entertainment, and AI Orchestration Agents and the Human Bottleneck
  • Day 2: AI GTM Building Workshop & Show & Tell
  • Day 3: Startup Founder Stories: Live & Uncut, and Accountability That Actually Works: A Playbook for First-Time Founders
  • Day 4: Zero-to-One Growth Playbook for Early Stage B2B Startups, and the MuckerLab Startup Accelerator Info Session

This post covers Day 3. The slides for both sessions are below.

Session 1: Startup Founder Stories: Live & Uncut

 

All four are Mucker portfolio companies, spanning supply chain software, consumer genomics, clinical research and B2B marketplaces, which turned out to matter: where they agreed, they agreed across wildly different businesses.

Where the companies came from

Soapbox is a supply chain intelligence platform, data middleware and AI for enterprises, e-commerce and retail. Danny describes it as the central nervous system for supply chain. Nearly eight years in, through the Mucker accelerator in 2020, and as of this week the only company to have taken investment from every Mucker fund, accelerator through growth. Over $20 million raised.

Sequencing.com builds the interface between your DNA and you, turning a DNA test from a one-time purchase into lifelong health intelligence. It has grown from about 20 people to close to 80 in the past year on roughly $12 million raised, with a deliberate focus on profitability, plus growth financing of up to $75 million from General Catalyst's customer value fund.

Citruslabs is the leading provider of decentralized clinical trials for consumer brands: supplements, skincare, functional food and beverage, some biotech. Mucker first invested in 2017. Total raised is $3.5 million, and the company has been profitable for six years, profitable enough to buy out some of its investors. Susanne's aside on that: some of them didn't want out.

LeadrPro is a B2B marketplace connecting buyers and sellers of software and AI products. Four years old, just under $2 million raised, just under $4 million in ARR, cash flow positive early.

How they got here

The origin stories had nothing in common, which was the point.

Susanne started in 2016 doing patient recruitment for pharmaceutical clinical trials, a problem she still rates as a billion-dollar company if anyone cracks it. Then March 16, 2020. Every clinical trial halted, revenue went to zero, and she had to let 25 to 30 people go over two months, having just hired them. What followed was Will at Mucker connecting her to consumer brands looking for clinical trials. One commissioned a study for a skincare line. It worked, and surprised everyone including them. A second brand followed. They ended 2020 profitable, having spent part of that year wondering whether to declare bankruptcy, and the flywheel started there.

Brandon's is the most personal. He was born with a genetic disease affecting his skin, which looks normal but is extremely temperature sensitive. As a child he sat on the sidelines rather than run around, or he would get blisters on the bottoms of his feet. His whole perception of the world was that he was the way he was because of his genes, and he was not happy about the control they had over him. That took him to Mount Sinai as a physician studying medical genetics and internal medicine, where he found that almost no healthcare provider used genetic information at all.

Danny's was neither. He opened with "mine is not personal or fascinating" and described a career across IBM, Disney, product management and private equity, ending as a COO consolidating the operations of 52 brands in 2018. The realization was that e-commerce and retail were in full swing with no technology suite connecting any of it. His words: "I've got the dashboard of like 20 different software to run this business." He had no background in supply chain, e-commerce or software development, only in solving problems.

Fundraising, told honestly

This was the longest stretch of the panel and the most useful.

On the first round. Danny raised pre-revenue through the accelerator, a first round of $768,000 split between Mucker and friends and family. He also took equity out of a fully paid-off house and put it into the company. He was emphatic that nobody should copy this: "do not take mortgage out of your fully paid house to fund your business that you have no idea what you're doing." His reasoning at the time was signalling, being able to tell an investor he was not asking for more financial commitment than he had made himself.

Chris pushed the same idea harder. His test is whether you would be willing to ask your dying grandmother for her last thousand dollars and feel confident you could return it. If you don't have the conviction to ask the people nearest to you, you won't have the narrative to walk into a room of strangers and ask them.

Susanne disagreed, directly and from experience. She is an immigrant from Germany, both parents passed away early, her family and friends are not wealthy, and a friends-and-family round is not a thing there. "Nobody has 5k to start with just to invest in something." She had no network in the US when she arrived. The friends-and-family round was never on the table.

She also turned down a $6 million check from a tier-one fund, a decision she said even Will called crazy, because they worked out they could get to $6 million without giving up equity. Her broader rule on picking investors is that they have to be builders. Will and Eric are entrepreneurs who know what it is to start and run a business. A lot of VCs, including at tier-one funds, are finance people.

Brandon's early raise was a small friends-and-family round aimed at proving users would actually use the product. They were a marketplace then. It was Mucker's feedback, specifically Will's, that they were thinking too small and needed to move to top of funnel and recurring revenue. They pivoted. The competitors who stayed in the marketplace model are no longer around.

On the landscape changing. Susanne pointed out that at the end of 2016, $5,000 in MRR made a seed round easy to raise, and that is gone. Jenn's read from the investor side is that the tools now make first revenue cheap enough that investors dig in hard if you cannot get a product into a paying customer's hands. Brandon called it a pendulum: 2021 was aggressive and money came easily on moderate traction, and 2025 was difficult even with strong metrics and profitability. His conclusion was that sometimes it is not you, it is the environment, and knowing which environment you are in should drive whether you raise at all and at what valuation.

On the part nobody enjoys. Danny has personally spoken to more than 500 investors across seven and a half years. Seven are on the cap table. The single thing he would tell his younger self:

You will never convince somebody to change their mind.

He has never converted an investor who was on the fence. The trap for first-time founders is spending meeting after meeting trying to prove why you're right, mistaking it for due diligence, when the honest read is that it was never going to convert. His advice is to be protective of your time because prospective investors will not be, and to treat a bad gut feeling as a reason to walk. He once drove an investor to LAX, answered everything well, and got ghosted.

Getting the first meeting

Three different answers, two of which converged.

Susanne did cold outreach and was, by her own description, extremely annoying about it. She built a list of 20 or 30 investors who actually invested in her space rather than SaaS, and pursued them. Sometimes she knew where their office was. Her line to one of them: "Hi, I sent you this email and I added you on LinkedIn. Why are you not getting back to me?"

Danny did no cold outreach at all. He met Mucker at a founder-meets-funder event, the last one before COVID lockdown, and almost every investor since has come through Mucker or through an investor Mucker introduced.

Both he and Brandon landed on the same ranking, and it is worth internalizing: a founder introduction to a fund beats an investor introduction. Jenn confirmed it from the other side. An investor already in your company has skin in the game and obviously wants you to raise, so the signal is discounted. A founder with no stake vouching for you is not. Brandon's experience was that only two kinds of intro ever worked, founder intros and intros from investors who were also going to invest in that round.

Danny's addition: a founder intro is also the path of least resistance, because nine out of ten founders will try to help another founder.

The hiring mistake all four made

The question was what they did with the money once it was in the bank. All four answered with the same mistake.

Susanne was told by investors to hire a sales team, because apparently she was not good at sales. They hired a VP of sales and four reps. It was the biggest hiring mistake the company has made. He was good at what he did, but not at their stage, having come from companies with far more resources than an eight-person startup. Nothing closed. They let him go, she took over sales, it went well, and she only hired another salesperson after they had passed $1 million in annual revenue. She still does sales today.

Chris did the same thing despite being a go-to-market person by trade, because the way they closed agency clients turned out to be nothing like selling a marketplace. His framing of the rule:

You need to know what success or failure looks like before you go hire against it.

He also thinks the founder should simply be the best salesperson in the company, because nobody else has the equity. And he is blunt about pedigree: someone who led sales at a Fortune 500 was spending resources you do not have. Across hundreds of companies, he cannot think of one where hiring against the problem worked.

Danny's version is the funniest and the same. His first five hires were from UPS, UPS, FedEx, FedEx and DHL. It turns out those companies don't have sales, they have account management. They arrived with deep industry knowledge and no idea how to sell. His diagnosis: "it's really tempting when you have your first check to hire somebody to solve a problem that you don't know what it is."

Brandon avoided it by doing every job first. He installed Zendesk and answered customer emails. He set up the Facebook ads account and wrote the first ad. He created the Mailchimp account and wrote the emails himself, before AI existed to do it. By the time he hired into those roles he already knew what worked, which made it obvious when a hire wasn't working. The only role he couldn't cover was engineering, so engineers were the first real hires.

His separate warning on zero-to-one hiring: plenty of candidates from large companies believe they have an entrepreneurial streak, including people on teams with a mandate to think like a startup. It is completely different in an actual startup. You are looking for someone who doesn't just survive ambiguity but thrives in it, and most people can't.

What to do with the first check

Danny's answer arrived mid-panel and was the one the room reacted to.

When you raise money, that first money should go to you. And I don't mean it should go into your pocket. It should be investing in yourself to invest in the company.

Not hiring someone to do your job. Paying yourself enough to put in the extra time to understand your own systems, so you know what the next step is before you deploy capital at it. He rates it the best ROI available at any stage, pre-seed through Series F.

Then he admitted he didn't do it. After their $4.3 million seed, where everyone including him had been on a normalized $60,000 salary, the first thing they did was pay the team their back pay. Looking back he would slow-roll the hires and spend more time understanding the next step rather than solving problems externally.

Go-to-market

Brandon described moving from marketplace to top of funnel as almost going to market a second time: study the competitors, talk to customers, find where the existing solutions don't actually solve the problem. They did it on a shoestring, deliberately, because early assumptions are usually wrong and they wanted to be able to move. He still answers customer emails and still joins customer success team meetings.

Susanne's marketing lead came from a party in 2018, someone at a venture studio launching CPG brands who was interested in the space and joined in 2019. Her approach is the opposite of a big budget: know where you're not good, hire someone who is, and let them run continuous experiments on content style, wording, subject lines, body copy and graphics, then double down on what converts.

Chris's contribution was about the gap between talking and listening. The hard part was removing his ego from the loop and acting as a conduit between the customer and the product. They built things because they thought they were cool, and it was the unsexy things customers kept repeating that they should have been building.

How they use AI now

None of them started as AI-native companies. All four have gone further than "we're experimenting."

Chris runs about 20 agents across the teams, with the same discipline he teaches: it has to tie back to top-line revenue or to displacing or replacing a headcount. It requires a lot of babysitting to reach real ROI.

Susanne has the entire organization running on it, to the point that the marketing team built their own replacement for HubSpot because they thought they could do better. The resistance came from the PhDs and MDs on staff, who hit one glitch and conclude the whole thing doesn't work. The company policy is now that everyone uses AI, and they run a Slack ticketing system where one agent investigates a bug and dispatches another to fix it.

Brandon hit the same resistance and decided to go all the way. Sequencing now has an internal term, the AI true believer, and every new hire has to fit it regardless of the role they're being hired for. For existing staff it is not "try it and we'll revisit in six months," it's more every single week. His reasoning is existential: if they don't embrace it, somewhere there is a kid with a laptop running a hundred agents around the clock who will build the product and get to market first.

Danny has the most specific constraint. Reconciliation work that used to take six weeks takes three days. But supply chain cannot be probabilistic. A tracking number cannot maybe be that number, and a stock level cannot maybe be that figure. Because Soapbox built the enterprise data architecture layer first rather than starting at the AI layer, they can run advanced math models on demand against real production data and stay deterministic. His aside: the AI companies that raised $5 million in supply chain on the promise of things are no longer around.

What they'd tell themselves on day one

Jenn's closing question was explicitly not for generic founder advice.

Brandon: persistence is the founder's superpower and it turns into kryptonite just as fast. You need it for the long nights and the low cash balance and the stream of people telling you you're wrong. You also need the humility to accept that a core assumption has been disproven, and that the path you think is right is probably not the path. That serves the company even when it doesn't serve your ego.

Chris: put the infrastructure for clean data, tracking and attribution in place far earlier than feels necessary. Gut feel and grit carry you a while, but scale requires data-driven decisions. And remove your ego from the business as fast as you can, because founders who tie self-worth to the business take every rejection personally and stop making good decisions.

Susanne: product-market fit solves everything, fundraising and profitability included, and you will know when you have it.

Danny: if you treat your startup like a job, you'll get the outcome of a job. But he'd also tell himself that things would be okay, because he was hard on himself and bet everything. "It's not always the harder that you work that's going to get you there. Hard work is a given. That's baseline." What he was looking for was something like business-founder fit, the groove where it finally clicks.

From the audience

Does a solo founder need a technical co-founder? Danny's answer: less important for the VCs, more important for you, because that partner makes or breaks the business. Don't optimize for the most competent engineer, optimize for the person who can translate your business vision into technology. Jenn's investor view is that she wants a team complementary to the founder's weaknesses, and prefers either a co-founder or a credible plan to bring one in. Brandon, a solo founder himself, found it was fine through pre-seed and seed, but at Series A the leadership team became the thing investors examined. He waited probably too long to build it, and now has a COO he can talk to the way you'd talk to a co-founder.

Does listening to customers ever lead you wrong? Both answers landed in the same place. Brandon: customers are reliable on problems and unreliable on features, because they don't know what they want. "Beware customers, because every single one will know exactly what is best for your business, and then when you go and implement that, no one will go and actually purchase it." Danny put it more simply: listen to your customers' problems, don't listen to them for the solution.

On taking a loan against your house, from a founder who had done exactly what Danny warned against: Danny's answer was that he had more fear of not going all in than of going all in, and that the money was already earned. "It was mortgaging my past, not mortgaging my future."

On buying investors out, Susanne explained that after about six years they asked whether anyone wanted their money back, some did, and they ran that again last year, leaving the cap table fairly minimal. Part of it is a German generational view of building a business she would be happy to run for another forty or fifty years. Jenn supplied the investor logic: if the founder never intends to sell, selling shares back is the only liquidity event available.

How do you get people to work for free before you raise? Chris offered two real routes: internships registered through a school for class credit, or sweat equity for someone who believes in what you're building. His own CTO came through a YC co-founder application, convinced by evidence that Chris could drive traffic to a landing page and capture leads.

How do you hand sales off without churn? Susanne separates them: growth is sales, churn is customer success. She doesn't hire salespeople at all. She hires people who understand what is being sold, from health science, PhD or CPG backgrounds, and teaches them to sell, because "you can teach people how to sell, but you cannot teach people your industry." Brandon has no sales team either, just growth marketing on paid search and paid social, where performance is visible fast enough to bonus against. Danny's best salespeople are former warehouse operators. His rule: hire salespeople who are already where your customers are.

How do you convince an industry to abandon legacy workflows? Danny's answer was the bluntest moment of the session: you can't. You cannot force someone to innovate who doesn't want to, and trying is the same wheel-spin as trying to convert an investor who isn't there. Take the no as a no and let them come back when they're ready. His example: the largest luxury brand in the world, which is an investor in Soapbox, told him plainly they are never going to use the software, because their teams have run on silos for decades and the platform creates too much transparency. Susanne's counter is to lead with the specific problem the incumbents don't solve, which in her case is patient recruitment and retention, and let that be the wedge.

Session 2: Accountability That Actually Works: A Playbook for First-Time Founders

Chris Sheng stayed on from the panel to run this one. He has been doing growth marketing and go-to-market for thirteen years, has worked with Mucker for seven of them, has advised more than a thousand venture-backed startups, and is a three-time founder.

The reason he finds accountability interesting is an observation from those thousand companies: you can share every trick, hack, tip and playbook, and only something like 10 to 20% of founders will actually execute on it. The rest don't, for reasons that have nothing to do with the quality of the advice. So the two things that decide outcomes, in his view, are self-awareness and then accountability to that self-awareness.

It was a smaller room than the panel, so he started by asking why people had come. The answers set up most of what followed:

  • How a solo founder holds themselves accountable to something that isn't easy
  • How to choose between B2B and B2C when your product could be either and your industry isn't especially AI-friendly
  • How lofty six-month goals connect to granular daily ones, and whether "build in public" is a fad
  • How to prove out a product that needs substantial investment before it can exist
  • What to do after a first wave of growth stalls and you're looking for the second

The thing founders won't do

Before any of that he picked up a conversation from earlier in the day. He had told someone the answer to getting in front of customers was in person, and watched them become visibly uncomfortable. Their instinct was to ask whether there was a particular email or LinkedIn DM that would work instead.

His response was to ask how easy it is to delete an email you aren't even reading. Then he asked what the person had actually felt when he said in-person, and the honest answer was that they had gone straight to the worst case.

That is the pattern he keeps running into. Founders focus on their own discomfort rather than the outcome the business needs. Doing the uncomfortable thing is hard, which is precisely why it works. If it weren't, every founder would succeed. No playbook solves the gut check, and the founders who go furthest are the ones who get past the intrinsic fear of rejection.

To the founder whose product needs funding before it can be built, his answer was the same in a different shape: you still need to talk to customers and prove the pain is big enough that someone will pay for it. That requires no capital and not a single line of code.

The odds, stated plainly

He has run accountability groups for about a year now as a deliberate experiment, currently three cohorts and 50 founders total, asking whether there are triggers and exercises that incrementally improve how many founders stay in the game past three or six months and actually make progress.

The first thing he puts in front of them is the arithmetic:

  • 90% of startups fail
  • Less than 1% get venture funding
  • 72% of founders struggle with mental health
  • 81% hide their stress, fears and challenges from others

Put plainly, you have put yourself in an unstable environment, and it is worth being honest with yourself about why.

Why are you here?

Everyone starts the marathon. Not everyone is running the same race. The people who enter a marathon intending to place train completely differently from the 80% in the middle of the pack, and if you are in this race, someone in your category is training to place against you.

Both answers are fine. Building a billion-dollar public company is a valid goal. So is building something that a private equity firm might buy that throws off seven million a year. They are entirely different businesses to run, and the mistake is not knowing which one you are building.

His own example: he was about to raise a $5 million seed. A mentor who had exited three times, including a unicorn where he owned less than 1%, and whose last and most financially successful exit was a sale to Gusto where he was the only signature required, asked him what he wanted for the company. Chris said he wanted to take it public, and admits he was bluffing his way through the answer. Asked why, he said it would be a symbol of the impact he had made on the industry.

So the mentor asked what he would do if someone offered $15 million for the business right then. Chris paused, because that is life-changing money, and said he would think about it. The mentor's point landed: you just told me your goal, and it changed in one question.

They rephrased the fundraising goal, raised considerably less than $5 million, and haven't raised since. He owns 61% of the business.

Entrepreneurship is personal

It is an isolated, lonely journey even with a co-founder, and harder without one. It will affect your relationships, your health and your identity.

The trap he returned to from the panel: founders tie their business idea too closely to their own self-worth, so every rejection and every piece of constructive criticism lands personally. He has watched founders turn combative while someone is trying to walk them through a framework meant to help.

The shape of the first year is predictable. Week one is the high of having quit. Three to six months in, you aren't making money, you're dipping into savings faster than expected, and the honeymoon ends. If you grind through that, the failures start to compound into things that work.

The intangibles

Three things he sees in nearly every founder who makes it:

  • Grandiosity. A belief that you deserve something more than the job and the colleagues you left.
  • Insecurity. A chip on the shoulder, a lack of self-worth that keeps chasing you. He includes himself.
  • The ability to execute. Relentlessness about getting things done.

One belief pushing you forward, one thing chasing you, and the capacity to keep shipping. Stacked over enough time, that becomes real progress.

Beyond those, the traits he treats as table stakes:

Grit. The thing separating first place from fifth. Everyone in the top twenty of a marathon is running a similar regimen; grit is the last two or three miles.

Self-awareness. Being able to look in the mirror and say honestly what you are willing to give.

Bias to action. He sees this missing most often in technical founders, who want to perfect something before shipping. The moment it reaches the market the customer tells you what's wrong anyway, so the extra 50% of time spent polishing was usually waste.

Accountability. Where he thinks building in public genuinely helps, not as throwing things at a wall, but as publishing clear goals and milestones so that someone could notice if you missed them.

Customer obsession. Outside maybe 0.01% of builders doing something genuinely unique, everyone needs to talk to customers at every stage.

Learning speed, which he reframes as speed to failure. You don't need a hundred things to work, you need one in a hundred. The opportunity might be behind the hundredth door, and the question is whether you knock on 99 or quit at the tenth.

Accountability is a habit you can build

Building a habit takes about three months. His accountability groups run six, and 40 to 50% of people drop off around the two-to-three-month mark. He has stopped treating that as a failure of the program and started treating it as a fact about human behaviour.

His analogy for it: three floors up, stairs or elevator. Almost everyone knows the stairs are better in the long run and the elevator is easier right now, and 98% take the elevator. Building a startup, adopting AI, talking to customers in person: the split is the same.

What he thinks you can actually improve is the structure around it:

  • Binary goals. Attach a number. Make 50 calls this week. Close $5,000 in MRR. Sign two pilots. Then it's simply done or not done.
  • Weekly cadence. Set it inside a sprint so there's a point at which you answer for it.

The model behind the groups is a fitness coach for founder milestones. A coach can point you at the machine, set the weight and tell you the reps, but you do the lifting. And if you can't move that weight, the answer is to recalibrate rather than quit, then increase it once you can. What you want is baby wins every week, stacked, until three or six months later you look back at the distance covered.

The Revenue-First Model

The most directly usable thing in the session. Start at the number and work downward until you reach something you can do this week:

  1. Revenue. Close $X from Y customers.
  2. Contracts. Get X contracts, pilots or LOIs signed.
  3. Activation. Get X signups or active users.
  4. Conversations. Get X demos or customer calls.
  5. Qualified. Get X positive responses.
  6. Replies. Get X responses.
  7. Outreach. Send X emails, DMs or calls.
  8. Pipeline. Build a list of X leads.
  9. Foundation. Define X ICPs.

You plan downward and execute upward. Your weekly milestone is the lowest row you cannot yet hit consistently. Keep it binary. Miss two weeks running and the number is too high, which is a calibration problem rather than a character one.

Always talk to the customer

Before a line of code: is the problem real, what do they use today, would they pay? While you build: watch them use it, see where they get stuck. As you grow: why did they buy, why did they churn, who looks like them? Forever: the founder stays on calls every week.

The meeting is the unit of progress. Everything else is a hypothesis.

Get the meeting

The reframe is deliberately uncomfortable. If someone put a gun to a family member's head and told you to get a meeting with a specific person, you would not talk about your product. The stakes change what you say, so why is your outreach about your solution?

Ways that work: pay for time, starting around $50 for 15 minutes. Ask for research rather than pitching. Give value first by solving something that isn't about your product. Be in the communities they already attend. Map the relationships, because warm intros beat cold. And invite them onto a podcast or a panel.

Every go-to-market problem is one of three variables

Audience, channel, messaging. Change one at a time, measure, repeat.

  • No replies? Check audience, then messaging.
  • Replies but no meetings? Messaging, specifically your ask.
  • Wrong people on the calls? Audience. Tighten the ICP.
  • Cannot reach them at all? Channel. Go where they are.

Do it by hand first. Automate only what's proven.

What's changing

The fundamentals don't change. The tools do.

AI in operations is not a feature on the product, it's a layer across how the company runs: prototypes to put in front of customers before you hire engineers, research and list building and personalization in sales, call notes and onboarding in service, docs and reporting in the back office. The learning curve doesn't shrink while you wait, it just moves, and you pay it later as a catch-up gap.

Attention. As the cost to build falls, the cost of attention rises. That is the argument for building in public: trust, because people buy from founders they've watched build; feedback from customers in the open; and distribution you didn't pay for. His prediction is that more founders go live and let clippers carry it into feeds.

What changes, what never does

Never changes: the intangibles, talking to customers from day one to scale, getting the meeting, and optimizing audience, channel and messaging.

Always changing: the tools, where attention lives, how fast anyone can build, and how far behind you are if you wait.

Thank you to our partners Michael Best and Vercel for making Mucker's 2026 LA Tech Week Day 3 possible.

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